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COMMENT:  DNA AS PROPERTY:  IMPLICATIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA DRAGNETS
Jonathan F. Will*
INTRODUCTION
Joe Smith is a maintenance worker at County Hospital.  One morning he
reported to work to find an array of law enforcement vehicles and personnel
scattered about the premises.  He proceeded to his locker to prepare for work
and was confronted by a policeman.  Apparently an elderly female patient was
sexually assaulted late one night during the previous week.  The police officer
informed Joe that all male employees were required to give a blood sample to
rule out their implication in the assault.  Joe was apprehensive and stated that
because he worked first shift, he could not possibly have been involved.  The
police officer told Joe that a warrant would be obtained if he resisted.
Reluctantly, Joe agreed, though he did not understand how a sample of his
blood could help this investigation.  Was Joe required to give this blood
sample, and further, should he have been afforded any constitutional
protections?
For over fifteen years worldwide law enforcement agencies have used
DNA profiling to aid in their investigations.1  While the benefits of such
technology cannot be understated, especially when it comes to ensuring that
justice is served,2 civil rights can be endangered by DNA profiling.3  The use
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of DNA dragnets is a paradigmatic example.4  This law enforcement strategy
involves the mass DNA sampling of individuals whom authorities have neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe perpetrated the crime in
question.5  It is the DNA extracted from Joe’s blood sample that will aid the
police in tracking down the perpetrator of the assault at County Hospital.
Unlike fingerprints used for identification purposes, however, an individual’s
DNA contains a myriad of information about health and genetic identity that
deserves increased protection.6
This comment will argue that when the state seeks to deprive a person of
his or her DNA, greater constitutional protections than are currently afforded
dragnets must be provided.  Part I will discuss the unique properties of DNA,
the information contained therein and why it should be constitutionally
protected.  Part II will briefly trace the history of DNA dragnets, including the
practical and procedural uses in worldwide criminal investigations.  Part III
will explore current law and commentary regarding Fourth Amendment
privacy interests in one’s DNA.  Part IV will argue that DNA constitutes
personal property, and finally, Part V will show how recognition of property
rights in DNA implicates Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment to
such an extent that the process currently used in DNA dragnets is
constitutionally inadequate.
I.  THE NATURE OF DNA AND GENETIC TESTING
Deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) is the major component of the
chromosomes found in nearly every cell in the human body.7  The double
helical structure is comprised of two strings of nucleotide building blocks that
come in four types:  adenine (A), thymine (T), cystosine (C), and guanine
(G).8  Our genetic make-up consists of a linear sequence of these nucleotides,
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9. Each triplet encodes one of the twenty amino acids that are the building blocks of protein.  For
example, CCT codes for proline and GAG for glutamic acid.  Id.
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11. Id. at 2286-87.  Scientists hope that a complete mapping of the human genome will reveal the
precursors to all genetic disorders, thus making one’s DNA similar to a “reverse diary:  it informs our
younger selves about our aging selves.”  George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy:  There Ought to Be a Law, 4
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9, 11 (1999).
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16. Returning to the music metaphor, VNTRs “would be places where the record skipped and
repeated a number of times before playing the rest of the tune.  The number of repeats in each VNTR tends
to vary from individual to individual, thus creating an RFLP.”  Id.
17. Id.; see also Symposium, supra note 2, at 423 (stating that “[t]he areas we look at don’t tell us
anything about the tendency to develop a disease or whether somebody already has it”).
and the genetic code is read three nucleotides at a time.9  The code itself, the
genome, contains each individual’s hereditary information as well as genetic
predispositions for genetic disorders.10  Despite this complexity, over ninety-
nine percent of the genetic code between two individuals is identical.  It is this
sharing that justifies the billions of dollars spent on the Human Genome
Project.11
DNA profiling works by testing the molecule’s structure for variation:
“Of the 3 billion nucleotides in the human genome, about one in a thousand
is a site of variation, or polymorphism.”12  The most common type of analysis
used today is known as Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
(“RFLP”), which identifies alterations in the length of DNA fragments.13
Upon receipt of a cell sample, for example from hair, blood, or cheek swab,
a technician extracts the DNA and exposes it to a restriction enzyme, “which
cuts the long chainlike DNA molecules into ‘restriction fragments.’”14  These
fragments are then separated and sorted by length using a process called
electrophoresis.15  Radioactive probes are then used to position and bind
fragments of interest, known as variable-number tandem repeats (“VNTR”).16
Law enforcement officials attempt to find matches by comparing VNTRs from
the samples found at the crime scene to those obtained through sampling
strategies such as the DNA dragnet.  Thus, forensic DNA tests do not actually
“read” the genetic code itself, they simply measure the length of restriction
fragments for comparison.17
If this is the case, what privacy concerns exist?  During questioning at a
symposium sponsored by American University, Dr. F. Samuel Baechtel from
the FBI DNA unit, conceded that “[o]nce you have the cells from someone,
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22. If Joe’s wife is not a carrier, there is no chance that their child could be affected by Sickle Cell.
See id.
23. See GLENN MCGEE, THE PERFECT BABY:  A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO GENETICS 96 (1997)
(arguing that insurance providers should not be permitted to apply “pre-existing condition” status to fetuses
because it wrongly assumes that the gene is the same as the disease).
24. Annas, supra note 11, at 13 (stating that “genetic information is uniquely private and should be
protected by law”); Grand, supra note 3, at 2309.
then the potential exists to essentially probe anywhere within that DNA.”18
This means that those with access to the DNA have access to the originator’s
hereditary information, implicating family members as well, and to his or her
genetic predispositions.  The concern with DNA testing, then, lies in the
potential for abuse.
Although he may not know it, Joe Smith carries the recessive gene
mutation associated with Sickle Cell Anemia.  Sickle Cell is an autosomal
recessive disorder found with high frequency in those of African descent.19
In some parts of Africa, for instance, the carrier frequency is one out of every
three, attributed to “the selective advantage it provides against a form of
malaria.”20  Although a carrier, Joe himself does not suffer from Sickle Cell
disease.
Joe’s wife is pregnant with their first child.  As with all autosomal
recessive disorders, if Joe’s wife is also a carrier of the mutation, their child
has a 25% chance of being affected with the disease, a 50% chance of being
an unaffected carrier, and a 25% chance of being neither affected nor a carrier
of the mutation for Sickle Cell.21
After the investigation, and at County Hospital’s request, the police
provided the hospital with the DNA samples taken from the employees.  The
hospital performed its own genetic test, and upon learning of Joe’s carrier
status, informed him that his wife would need to have a genetic test performed
to determine her carrier status.  Further, if she were found to be a carrier,22
their unborn child would also have to be tested.  In the event that the child
were found to be affected by the disorder, Joe’s wife’s pregnancy would not
be covered under his insurance plan because of the child’s pre-existing
condition.23
The information contained on the human genome is highly personal and
private in nature.24  Although the Supreme Court has yet to specifically
address the rights attaching to DNA, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
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29. Angus J. Dodson, Comment, DNA “Line-Ups” Based on a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 71
U. COLO. L. REV. 221, 223 (2000).
30. Id. at 224.
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first recognized constitutionally protected “zones of privacy,”25 later expanded
to include an interest in preventing the disclosure of intimately personal
information.26  One can hardly deny the intimate and personal nature of the
information contained in the human genome—“anything from a person’s
medical conditions and predispositions to her mental attributes.”27  The
potential that this information might be disclosed to employers or insurance
companies poses the risk of an “intrinsic dignitary harm” to the individual.28
For example, the information obtained from Joe’s blood sample led to the
subjection of his family to prying inquiries from his employer and the threat
of losing health insurance to cover his wife’s pregnancy.  Given these
potential ramifications, the procedure used to obtain Joe’s DNA warrants
heightened scrutiny.
II.  THE HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF DNA DRAGNETS
The law enforcement personnel gathered at County Hospital were
carrying out a DNA dragnet.  The first recorded use of mass DNA sampling
occurred in the small village of Narborough, England in 1986.29  After the rape
and murder of two teenage girls, the police sought voluntary DNA samples
from over 4,500 men in the surrounding area.30  Ironically, the true perpetrator
confessed and was convicted only after he raised suspicion with the police by
convincing another man to submit a sample in his place.31
Since the Narborough incident, DNA dragnets expanded to continental
Europe.  In 1998 the largest known mass DNA test was performed in
Strueklingen, Germany, where 16,400 individuals were sampled in connection
with the rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl.32  In this case, authorities
eventually found a match with a man who had a prior rape conviction.
The practice has also developed in the United States.  One of the larger
samples was taken in Dade County, Florida in an attempt to apprehend the
“Tamiami Strangler,” a killer of six prostitutes who dumped his victims’
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34. Id.  The culprit was eventually apprehended after a subsequent attempted rape.  Id.
35. Id. at 481 (stating that samples were taken from 800 men matching the general description of
a dark-skinned male in 1990). 
36. Halbfinger, supra note 5, at A8 (stating that 160 samples were obtained from black men after
the rape of thirteen women in 1994).
37. Id. (stating that 400 male workers at a county hospital where an administrator had been raped
were tested in 1998).
38. Id. (stating that samples taken from thirty-two men at a nursing home where a resident had been
raped and impregnated in 1999).
39. Drobner, supra note 1, at 482.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  In Katz police used a listening device to
eavesdrop on a phone booth conversation.  Id. at 348.  The Court held that individuals should be secure
from searches conducted “only in the discretion of the police,” as these violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id.
at 359 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
bodies outside the city of Miami.33  In Florida, 2,300 men were tested in 1995,
but the perpetrator was not among them.34  Other DNA dragnets were carried
out on a smaller scale in San Diego, California,35 Ann Arbor, Michigan,36
Prince George’s County, Maryland,37 and Lawrence, Massachusetts.38
Although these investigations vary in size and geographic location, they
“share one common trait—they are based on the fact that investigators have
not been able to focus suspicion on any particular individual as having
probably committed the crime.”39  By their very nature, DNA dragnets obtain
private, personal—and possibly incriminating—information from individuals
without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.
III.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.40
This Amendment is implicated upon a showing that those involved in DNA
dragnets have an expectation of privacy, and that such searches and seizures
are unreasonable.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects “people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”41  In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan suggested
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the Fourth Amendment, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 140 (2001).
44. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
45. Id. at 758-59.
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circumstances).
50. Id. at 772.
a two-fold requirement, “first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”42  Given the nature of
the information contained in one’s DNA, it is likely that society would find
it reasonable to expect privacy in this area.
During dragnets, DNA is generally collected through either blood samples
or the cheek swab popularized by television programs.43  In light of this, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Schmerber v. California is central.44  Schmerber
was hospitalized after having been in an automobile accident.  Believing
alcohol was involved, police took a blood sample without a warrant or his
consent.45  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the “overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”46  For intrusions going beyond the body’s
surface, the Fourth Amendment requires more than “mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained,” such that “fundamental human interests require
law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there
is an immediate search.”47  Further, because warrants are required for searches
of dwellings, “no less could be required where intrusions into the human body
are concerned.”48  Although the Court in Schmerber ultimately found in favor
of the policeman,49 by limiting its analysis to the facts presented by the record,
it underscored “[t]he integrity of an individual’s person” as a “cherished value
of our society.”50
The Court’s language in Schmerber seems to imply that blood samples
obtained from DNA dragnets violate the Fourth Amendment.  Because not
even reasonable suspicion exists to suggest that the individuals tested were
involved in the crime, the police have nothing more than a “mere suspicion”
that evidence will result from DNA samples taken beyond the body’s surface.
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By its very nature, DNA is carried in the cells of individuals for their entire
life; thus, exigent circumstances also do not exist.
The Supreme Court used a balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of blood and urine testing for drugs by the Federal Railroad
Administration.51  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was implicated
without an actual intrusion into the body, but determined that the seizures
were justified without a warrant or probable cause due to the government’s
strong interest in preventing accidents.52  The permissibility of a search is
“judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests,” beyond
the needs of law enforcement.53
While the government has a strong interest in keeping rapists and
murderers off the streets, the use of DNA dragnets is not an acceptable
procedure to do so.  The Fourth Amendment is meant to protect individuals’
privacy and dignity, and removing one’s DNA has the potential to intrude on
privacy and dignity in a very harmful way.  Focusing on the testing involved
in Skinner, the Court acknowledged safety as an immediate governmental
interest beyond law enforcement.54  Because DNA dragnets cannot promise
to identify the perpetrator of the crime,55 thereby removing the dangerous
person from the streets, no government interest beyond the traditional law
enforcement interest is realized by this procedure.
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Schmerber and Skinner, the
taking of bodily fluids or genetic material from an individual for testing is a
search constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.56  Fourth
Amendment guarantees, however, do not protect against all searches and
seizures; only unreasonable ones.  Searches performed with the consent of the
individual are reasonable.57  For example, if the dragnets are carried out with
the consent of those from whom samples are taken, they are likely reasonable.
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A superficial finding of consent does not end the inquiry, however,
because consent is only voluntary when given in the absence of duress or
coercion.58  Voluntariness is determined on a case-by-case basis considering
objective and subjective factors such as age, education, knowledge of the right
to refuse, and whether threats or physical punishment were used to induce
consent.59  In considering the surrounding circumstances, “account must be
taken of the subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.”60  Joe Smith’s limited
education—an important factor in the Bustamonte analysis61—made him
vulnerable and prevented him from understanding the significance of his
submitting to the blood sample.
The consent obtained by law enforcement officers involved in DNA
dragnets is questionably coercive.  Several of the men tested in Ann Arbor,
Michigan claimed to have been harassed by police, who told them that the
only way to clear their names was to submit to testing.62  One participant
reported that he was told that, if he did not cooperate, a court order would be
obtained.63  Similarly, in Maryland, two maintenance workers who were
detained in separate rooms felt coerced by the procedure having been “told”
that they would give a DNA sample, not asked if one could be collected.64
It is also impermissible for police to feign authority that they do not have.
In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that the consent given
by an elderly woman to police claiming to have a search warrant was not
valid.65  The Court stated, “[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority
to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has
no right to resist the search.  The situation is instinct with coercion . . . .”66
Similarities between Bumper and the aforementioned DNA dragnets suggest
that the consent obtained for many of these samples was not voluntary, and
therefore, constitutionally suspect.
Nonetheless, in the absence of consent, reasonableness can be found upon
a balancing of intrusiveness against government interest.67  In Davis v.
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68. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); Grand, supra note 3, at 2294; Dodson, supra
note 29, at 235.
69. Grand, supra note 3, at 2294.
70. Drobner, supra note 1, at 480; Dodson, supra note 29, at 227.
71. United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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76. See supra Part I.
Mississippi, the Supreme Court stated that fingerprinting may “constitute a
much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions,” and “involves none of the probing into an
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.”68
Dicta from this case left the door open for the possibility that fingerprinting
without probable cause or a warrant could be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment in some instances, though those instances were not spelled out.69
It is worth noting that the DNA identification process has been called
“DNA fingerprinting.”70  Unlike typical fingerprinting, the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the extent of invasiveness involved in DNA samplings.
However, a few lower federal and state courts have addressed the issue.  For
example, in United States v. Nicolosi, a federal district court concluded that
probable cause is necessary for the swabbing of the inner cheek to obtain a
saliva sample.71  The court began its analysis by acknowledging that three
state supreme courts require both probable cause and a search warrant for the
collection of saliva.72  The court concluded that obtaining blood or other
internal bodily fluids “requires full compliance with Fourth Amendment
procedures.  These items are not in the public domain and privacy and
dignitary interests are implicated by the method of obtaining the sample.”73
The Supreme Court of Vermont, on the other hand, held that this procedure
is not highly invasive.74
There is a marked difference between one’s fingerprints and one’s DNA.
In Davis, the Court noted that fingerprints do not probe into an individual’s
private life.75  Because of the unique characteristics of genetic material and the
information contained therein, such as medical conditions and gene mutations,
one’s private life is intimately tied to his or her DNA.76  In Joe Smith’s case,
access to his DNA allowed his employer to delve into not only his private life,
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but also that of his family.  Beyond the Fourth Amendment,77 further
protection could be offered to individuals faced with situations like Joe
Smith’s by attaching property rights to DNA.
IV.  DNA AS THE PROPERTY OF ITS ORIGINATOR
Very few cases have addressed property rights in relation to a person’s
organs, tissue, and genetic material.78  The seminal case in this area is Moore
v. Regents of the University of California.79  John Moore sought treatment at
the University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center (“UCLA”) for
hairy-cell leukemia, and David Golde, the attending physician, recommended
a splenectomy to slow the progression of the disease.80  Evidence showed that
before the operation Golde was aware that, due to their rare nature, certain of
Moore’s blood products and components were of significant commercial
value.81  After the procedure Moore was informed that his treatment required
follow-up testing, which he participated in for seven years.82  During that time,
Golde and his associate, Shirley Quan, removed tissue, sperm, bone marrow,
blood, and other samples from Moore.83  Throughout the seven years, Moore
was presented with complex consent forms relinquishing any rights in the cell
lines and derivatives created by Golde and Quan.84  From the research
performed on Moore’s tissues, Golde and Quan created and patented the
“MO” cell line.85  As a result, they entered into commercial contracts with
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DNA for research and commercial purposes).
96. Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-89.
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biotechnology companies and received more than $400,000 for access to a
potential market estimated at over $3.01 billion.86
Eventually, Moore became suspicious and refused to sign one of Golde
and Quan’s extensive consent forms.87  Moore ultimately brought a thirteen-
count action against Golde, Quane, Regents, and UCLA including a claim for
conversion of property.88  After a hearing, the trial court sustained Regent’s
demurrer on the conversion claim.89  On appeal, the court held that Moore had
established a claim for conversion, and thus, recognized that Moore had a
property interest in his bodily tissue.90 
In so finding, the California appellate court held that “‘property’ refers
not to a particular material object but to the right and interest or domination
rightfully obtained over such object, with the unrestricted right to its use,
enjoyment and disposition.”91  The court explained that there is a right of
dominion over one’s body and the interests therein, and that “[t]hese rights
and interests are so akin to property interests that it would be a subterfuge to
call them something else.”92
The Supreme Court of California ultimately reversed the appellate court’s
finding on this point.93  The court concluded that Moore’s consent to the
splenectomy amounted to an abandonment and relinquishment of any rights
over the tissues involved.94  As a matter of policy, the court was concerned
that holding otherwise would have a chilling effect on research and the
biotechnology industry.95
It is important to realize that the ruling in Moore dealt with tissue and
material that had already been removed from the individual’s body.96  By
speaking in terms of abandonment, the Supreme Court of California seemed
to suggest that, before the tissue was removed, Moore did have a property
interest in it.97  Justice Broussard proffered a dissenting opinion due to the
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majority’s failure to acknowledge the distinction between bodily tissue before
and after its removal.98  His dissent acknowledged that part of Moore’s
complaint dealt with his bodily tissue prior to removal, and as such, the
majority should not have rejected his conversion claim.99  Because the
majority of the court was not more explicit in Moore, there is concern that
biotechnology will have “free reign,” and that the ruling “fails to adequately
protect a patient-donor’s individual liberties.”100
In order to address this shortcoming in genetic research, the Genetic
Privacy Act (“GPA”) was prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Working Group (“ELSI”) of the Human
Genome Project, and proposed as a model for uniform adoption.101
Interestingly, the GPA clearly states that DNA is the property of the individual
from whom it was obtained.102  Although the GPA was never widely
adopted,103 it attempts to address the concerns surrounding genetic research
and privacy today.
V.  DUE PROCESS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In the area of research, arguments have been raised that DNA should be
afforded the protections of property law.  This comment has attempted to
show that the interest one has in his or her genetic information remains
constant whether in the research or criminal investigation setting.  Affording
individuals property rights in their DNA implicates further protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment regarding DNA dragnets.  In relevant part, this
Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”104
The Fourteenth Amendment invokes a two-part inquiry.  First, did a state
actor deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property.  If the answer is yes,
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one must consider what process is due when such a deprivation occurs.  The
Supreme Court has held that when an individual’s property rights are at stake
the minimum process due is “notice and the opportunity to be heard.”105  So
what process is due when police seek to deprive individuals of their DNA?
The process Joe Smith received in the deprivation of his DNA, common
in dragnets, was insignificant.  Without a warrant, probable cause, or even
reasonable suspicion, Joe was told that he had to submit to a blood sample.
When law enforcement officers seek to deprive an individual of property
pursuant to a criminal investigation more process is required than that given
during a DNA dragnet.
The Fourth Amendment provides that persons are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Reasonableness is presumed, when, after
sufficient process, a warrant is obtained.106  The Supreme Court has held that
“in the ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless . . .
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant.”107
The Court went on to acknowledge exceptions to the warrant
requirement:108  the search of an automobile supported by probable cause,109
suspicionless stops at drunk driver checkpoints,110 the temporary seizure of
luggage based upon reasonable suspicion,111 temporary detention of a suspect
without an arrest warrant in order to prevent flight and protect officers as they
executed a search warrant,112 and temporary stop and limited search for
weapons based on reasonable suspicion.113  None of these exceptions apply to
DNA dragnets.114
Using strictly Fourth Amendment analysis would permit a court to use the
dicta in Davis v. Mississippi to apply a reasonableness inquiry to DNA
dragnets.  In so doing, courts could allow police to subject individuals to DNA
testing without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any
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exception.115  Attaching property rights to DNA limits the extent to which a
court may focus on reasonableness by requiring a warrant unless an exception
exists.116  Because none of the exceptions exist in the dragnet setting, a
Supreme Court ruling that DNA is the property of its originator would require
warrants to be obtained prior to its removal.  Given its unique characteristics
and the information contained therein, more is at stake and more protection is
due when the state seeks to deprive an individual of DNA.
CONCLUSION
Due to the intimate and identifiable information contained in DNA, the
collection of DNA samples without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion raises constitutional concerns.  To date, opponents have used a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis coupled with concerns for
privacy to argue against the use of DNA dragnets.117  While these arguments
are meritorious and persuasive, dicta in Davis v. Mississippi presents the risk
that obtaining DNA through dragnets might be found reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.  Recognizing property rights in DNA would require state
actors to obtain a warrant before subjecting individuals to testing, because no
exception to this general rule applies to DNA dragnets.  This comment has
attempted to bridge the gap between concerns in criminal law and genetic
research,118 further buttressing the claim that these sorts of random profilings
should be avoided.
As in Joe Smith’s case, access to genetic information through DNA
testing provides the potential for abuse of extremely private and personal
information.  Proper law enforcement techniques should not be thwarted, but
the use of dragnets to obtain this information from individuals when there is
no warrant, probable cause, nor reasonable suspicion to believe they are
implicated in a crime, is constitutionally unacceptable.  The state has an
avenue for accessing such information, and following the proper
procedure—the warrant—DNA may be acceptably obtained.
